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THE SONG OF THE SIRENS-SANCTIONING
LAWYERS UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1927
Attorneys who abuse the litigation process contribute to rising
litigation costs) In an attempt to bring the costs home to those who
create them, courts have become more willing to impose sanctions
on attorneys who abuse the judicial process. 2 Although many federal
statutes provide for economic sanctions against attorneys," this note
See generally Levin & Colliers, Containing The Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219,
229, 231 (1985) (statistical analysis of costs and volume of litigation); see also Feirich, Delays
and the High Cost of Litigation: Some Thoughts About Alternatives, 70 ILL. B.J. 738, 738-39 (1982);
Grady, Trial Lawyers, Litigators and Clients' Costs, 4 LiTiGaTioN 5, 5-7, 58 (1978); Haring,
Stemming the Tide of Litigation Costs, 13 BRIEF 14, 14-16 (1983); Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A.
Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965, 965-69 (1980); Mid-
dleton, Judge Urges Cutting Needless Costs, Delays, 68 A.B.A. J. 525, 525-26 (1982); Nejelski,
With Justice Affordable for All, 19 JUDGES' J. 4, 4-9, 46 (1980).
2 See, e.g., In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Mallor, Punitive
Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 613, 619-53 (1983); Note,
Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. Cul. L. Rev. 619,
623-29 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts).
See generally Joseph, Rule 11 is Only the Beginning, 1988 A.B.A. J. 62, 62-65 (1988).
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that: lelvery pleading, motion,
and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall he signed" by the attorney. FED.
R. Civ. P. 11. The rule provides that this signature constitutes a certification that the signer
has read the pleading, motion or paper and that to the best of his or her knowledge "after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose ...." Rule I I expressly authorizes a court to sanction
any violator "upon motion or upon its own initiative" by assessing reasonable expenses
incurred including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The scope of Rule 11 is limited to the initial signing of a pleading, motion, or paper,
and therefore the attorney's conduct is judged at the time of signing only. Oliver' v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986). The rule is only applicable to civil litigation filings
in federal district court. It is not applicable to papers filed in connection with appeals, criminal
cases, or bankruptcy proceedings. Joseph, supra, at 62; see also Maffei, Rule 11—The Wrong
Approach to Professionalism in Civil Litigation, 73 Mass. L. Rev. 98, 98-99 (1988); Schwarzer,
Sanctions Under The New Federal Rule 1I—A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 184-85 (1985); Note,
Litigant Responsibility: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I I and Its Application, 27 B.C.L. Rev. 385,
385-406 (1986); Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding
Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 322-25 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Rule 11
Dynamics]; Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Constraining Frivolity in Litigation Under
Rule 11, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 1267, 1288-94 (1986).
In contrast to Rule I I, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a sanction
applied at the appellate level to attorneys responsible for filing frivolous appeals. Fen. R.
APP. P. 38. The statute states that: "[i]f a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is
frivolous,' it may award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." Id. Courts
apply an objective standard in assessing whether an appeal is frivolous under Rule 38. See
Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Joseph, supra, at
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focuses on the imposition of sanctions against attorneys under sec-
tion 1927 of the Judicial Code. 4 Section 1927 authorizes sanctions
against attorneys who "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiply the
proceedings. 5
 The statute was first enacted in 1813,6 and was
amended in 1980 specifically to add attorneys' fees to the list of
possible sanctions.' As a result of this amendment, courts have
invoked this statute more frequently. 8 The federal courts, however,
evidence widely disparate views concerning the applicable standard
for assessing whether an attorney has multiplied the proceedings
"unreasonably and vexatiously" within the meaning of the statute. 9
Some circuits impose a section 1927 sanction when an attorney's
62. Arguments "wholly without merit" are deemed frivolous, regardless of the absence of
improper motive. Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir.
1985) (quoting NLK13 v. Catalina Yachts, 679 F.2d 180, 182 (9th Cir. 1982)).
4 28 U.S.C, § 1927 (1982), amended September 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-349, Section 3, 94
Stat. 1156. Section 1927 of the Judicial Code, entitled Counsel's liability for excessive costs, reads:
Counsel's Liability fOr excessive costs—Any attorney or other person admitted
to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attor-
ney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
The statute was initially designed to reduce the litigousness of the United States attorneys
who were paid by the pleadings. In re TC[, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985); see also
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 n.6 (1980); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1234,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Com CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2716, 2782-83
[hereinafter HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT]; Annotation, What Conduct Constitutes Multiplying
Proceedings Unreasonably and Vexatiously So As To Warrant Imposition of Liability on Counsel Under
28 U,S,C.S. Section 1927 For Excess Costs, Expenses, and Attorney Fees, 81 A.L.R. FED. 36, 44
(1987).
3
 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
6 Ch. 14, Section 3, 3, Stat. 21 . (1813). See Note, Sanctions Imposed by Courts, supra note 2,
at 623. When first enacted in 1813, the statute read:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally such excess costs.
Id.
7
 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
Oliveri v. Thompson, 8(13 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987). The courts' recent willingness to impose sanctions against attorneys under this statute
has been traced to the 1983 amendment to Rule II. Joseph, supra note 3, at 62. According
to Joseph's theory, the courts' increased use of the amended Rule 11 (holding attorneys
personally accountable for their pleadings, motions and papers and placing an affirmative
duty on judges to order sanctions for violations) has resulted in a rediscovery and increased
use of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id.
See infra notes 29-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various standards




conduct is merely negligent, while other circuits require a showing
of reckless conduct or conduct evidencing willful bad faith.'°
This note analyzes the various standards that the circuit courts
use in order to determine whether an attorney has multiplied the
proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously" within the meaning of
28 § 1927. Section I of this note .
 investigates the scope of the
statute." Section 11 reviews the standards that the circuit courts
currently use.' 2
 Section III analyzes these standards in light of the
ability of each standard to achieve the goals of the statute.' 3
 This
note proposes two standards. One .standard is proposed for objec-
tively colorable claims, claims that are well grounded in fact and
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law. A more stringent
standard is proposed for claims that are not objectively colorable.' 4
For objectively colorable claims, the standard proposed for assessing
whether an attorney's conduct ',multiplies the proceedings "unrea-
sonably and vexatiously" is a standard that requires a showing of
willful bad faith. For objectively noncolorable claims, a standard
that requires a showing of reckless conduct is proposed.
I. SCOPE of 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Section 1927 of the Judicial Code, entitled Counsel's liability for
excessive costs, reads:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases
in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof
who so multiplies the proceedings in any .case unreason-
ably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.')
The statute applies to all proceedings in federal courts of all
levels.' 6
 Congress intended the statute to discourage dilatory liti-
ill id .
" See infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of 28
U.S.C. § 1927.
12 See infra notes 29-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various standards
utilized by the federal courts.
' 5 See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ability of the
standards to effectuate the goals of the statute.
See text following note 128 for the proposed dual standard.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
16 See, e.g., In re Ginther, 791 F.2d 1151,1156 (5th Cir. 1986) (civil case); Wisconsin v.
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gation practices and advocacy designed to burden an opponent,
without chilling aggressive litigation and good-faith assertions of
colorable claims.' 7
 Prior to the 1980 amendment, the statute re-
ferred only to "excess costs," which covered only such taxable costs
as filing fees."' The 1980 amendment expanded the category of
expenses to include "excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees,"
which broadened the range of expenses that a judge may require
an attorney to satisfy personally. 19
Section 1927 is penal in nature. 2° In the House Conference Report
on section 1927, Congress recognized that strict construction is
necessary so that the provision will in no way dampen the legitimate
zeal of an attorney in representing his or her client. 2 ' In addition,
strict construction is necessary so as not to chill an attorney's cre-
ativity in putting forth novel and creative legal theories. 22
Persons liable under section 1927 include any attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States
or any territory of the United States." The statute applies equally
to attorneys representing the winning party and the losing party,
Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1986) (criminal case); in re Usoskin, 56 Bankr. 805, 819
(E. D. N.Y. 1985) (bankruptcy proceeding).
HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
Id. Other taxable costs include: (I) fees of the clerk and marshal[; (2) fees of the court
reporter for all or any part of the stenographer's transcript neccessarily obtained for use in
the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification
and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees under Section
1923 of Title 28; (6) compensation of court-appointed experts. Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-58, (1980).
19 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
Sanctions awarding attorneys' fees are an exception to the American Rule that requires
each party to bear its own attorney's fees and legal costs. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975). The American Rule was originally designed
to foster free access to the courts by freeing potential plaintiffs from the fear that they would
be accountable for their opponents' legal fees if they were unsuccessful in their action. See
Note, Rule 11 Dynamics, supra note 3, at 304. One criticism of the American Rule is that a
wronged party cannot he made completely whole absent an award of legal expenses. See
Mallor, supra note 2, at 616. In general, statutory exceptions to the American Rule are limited
to situations where blameworthy conduct constitutes an abuse of the judicial process. See
Green, From Here To Attorney's Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness In The journey To The
Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1984).
20 See, e.g., Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd
in relevant part sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
21 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
22 See Mone v. C.1.R., 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1985) (court sanctioned appellant's
attorney pursuant to section 1927 because appellant's attorney submitted a carelessly written
brief based on arguments that were irrelevant to the appeal).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982).
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plaintiff's attorneys and defendant's attorneys. 24 Section 1927 cre-
ates liability only for excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of unreasonable and vexatious multi-
plication of the proceedings. 25 The statute does not authorize the
imposition of sanctions to reimburse a party for the ordinary costs
of trial. 26
The most problematiCal aspect of section 1927 concerns the
assessment of what type of conduct constitutes an "unreasonable
and vexatious" multiplication of the proceedings. Whether an at-
torney has increased the costs "unreasonably and vexatiously"
within the meaning of section 1927 depends upon whether the court
determines that the phrase "unreasonable and vexatious" implies a
bad faith or intentional misconduct requirement not explicit in the
statutory language. 27 A review of the federal judicial circuits reveals
that there is currently no uniform standard against which an attor-
ney's conduct is measured in order to determine whether an attor-
ney has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously."
11. REVIEW OF THE LAW—CIRCUIT TREATMENT OF THE
STANDARDS UTILIZED TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN ATTORNEY HAS
MULTIPLIED THE PROCEEDINGS "UNREASONABLY AND
VEXATIOUSLY"
This section reviews the different standards circuit courts use
in assessing whether an attorney's conduct is sanctionable under
section 1927. To facilitate the discussion that follows, this section
reviews the circuit courts' treatment of the issue in a non-sequential
order, grouping into subsections the circuits that utilize the same
standard. The first subsection reviews the circuits that use a "neg-
ligent conduct" standard. The second subsection reviews the circuits
that use a "willful bad faith" standard. The third subsection reviews
the circuits that use a "reckless conduct" standard. The last subsec-
tion reviews a circuit that utilizes a combination of the "negligent
conduct" standard and the "willful bad faith" standard. 28
24 Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980); see also Annotation, supra note
4, at 46 (circuit disagreement regarding whether section 1927 sanctions may be imposed
against pro se litigants).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); see United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610-11 (9th Cir.
1983).
26 See Blodgett, 709 F.2d at 610-11.
" Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982).
28 At present, there is insufficient case law from the First, Fourth, Eighth, Eleventh and
Federal Circuits from which to determine what standard these courts utilize in assessing
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A. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits: Negligent Conduct Standard
The Courts of Appeals . for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits use a
"negligent conduct" standard in assessing whether an attorney's
conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S,C. § 1927. Under this stan-
dard, the court may sanction an attorney whose negligent conduct
multiplies the proceedings, thereby creating excess costs. Because
negligent conduct alone is sufficient to warrant the sanction, it is
irrelevant whether the attorney engaged in the negligent conduct
for an improper purpose, such as to harass an opponent or cause
a delay.
In the 1986 case of Jones v. Continental Corp., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's
award of attorney fees and expenses against plaintiff-appellant's
counsel pursuant to section 1927. 2° Although the court recognized
that the Sixth Circuit had not previously construed the meaning of
"unreasonable and vexatious," it held that section 1927 authorized
a court to assess fees against an attorney for unreasonable and
vexatious multiplication of litigation "despite the absence of any
conscious impropriety." 30 According to the Jones court, when an
attorney "knows or reasonably should know" that a claim pursued
is frivolous, or that his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct
the litigation of nonfrivolous claims, a trial court does not err by
assessing fees attributable to such actions against the attorney. 3 '
whether an attorney's conduct is sanctionable under 28 V.S.C. 	 1927. In United States v.
Nesglo, Inc., 744 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1984) and In re Oximetrix, Inc., 748 F.2d 637, 644
(Fed. Cir. 1984), the courts affirmed the district courts' award of section 1927 sanctions
because bad faith was clearly present. In both cases, however, the courts failed to indicate
whether bad faith was or was not a requirement for the imposition of section 1927 sanctions.
In Limerick v. Greenwald, 749 F.2d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 1984), the court affirmed the section
1927 sanction without adequate indication as to the standard the court employed. In O'Con-
nell v. Champion Intl Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 n.2 (8th Cir. 1987), the court stated that the
question of whether section 1927 required a finding of bad faith in addition to unreasonable
conduct was not before the court. Similarly, in Hashemi v. Campaigner Publications, Inc.,
784 F.2d 1581, 1584 (11(11 Cir. 1986) and Amey, Inc, v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d
1486, 1510 (11th Cir. 1985), ten. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986), both courts of appeals held
that the district courts did not abuse their discretion in failing to award or in denying motions
to award sanctions pursuant to section 1927. The courts, however, failed to indicate their
reasons. In Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985),
it is unclear what authority or statute the court relied on for the imposition of sanctions.
29
 789 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1986).
3" Id. at 1230.	 •
id. The court perceived nothing in the record that could support a conclusion that
Jones's counsel "knew or should have known" that failure to amend the pleadings would
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The district court in Jones sanctioned the plaintiff's attorney
for failing to amend a complaint after the defendant filed a motion
for a more definite statement.32 The district court held that the
complaint was deficient because it failed to specify whether section
1981 or Title VII was the basis for the sex discrimination claims,
the claims against the individual defendants and the claim for
$1,000,000 in damages." In reversing the trial court, the Sixth
Circuit stated that the most cursory research would reveal that the
plaintiff's attorney brought the sex discrimination claims under
Title VII because section 1981 is not applicable to sex discrimination
claims. 34 In addition, the court concluded that Jones's counsel was
intentionally and .properly seeking recovery against the individual
defendants under both section 1981 and Title VII. The court also
determined that the attorney's request for $1,000,000 in damages
was a damage claim pursuant to section 1981 because Title VII does
not authorize general compensatory damages." The court held that.
the defense counsel could have easily resolved these uncertainties
without any significant expenditure of time, and therefore the fail-
ure of the plaintiff's attorney to clarify the complaint was not neg-
ligent conduct warranting a section 1927 sanction. 36
Elaborating on the negligent conduct standard, the Jones court
stated that Congress did not intend the 1980 amendment, adding
attorney fees, to require a finding of subjective "bad faith" because
the courts already had the "inherent power" to assess sanctions
against attorneys whose conduct evidenced bad faith. 37 The
amended sanction, the court explained, aims to deter the pursuit
of claims that are frivolous on the merits in addition to nonfrivolous
claims pursued through the use of multiplicative litigation tactics
that are harassing, dilatory, or otherwise "unreasonable and vexa-
tious.""
retain frivolous claims in the litigation or needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous
claims. Id. at 1230-31.
31 Id. at 1229 & n,3, The court of appeals noted that the defendant moved to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than moving for a
more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e). The court of appeals stated, however, that
the record indicated that the district court treated the motion as brought. under Rule 12(e).
Id,
33 Id. at 1231.
" Id,
" Jones, 789 F.2(1 at 1232.
" Id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1230,
3° Id. at 1233.
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In the 1987 case of In re Ruben, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed
the Jones test for determining whether an attorney's behavior war-
rants a section 1927 sanction." The Ruben court remanded the issue
of sanctions against plaintiff's counsel because the district judge
failed to delineate clearly whether he imposed the sanction pursuant
to section 1927, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
the court's inherent power to punish bad faith conduct during
litigation.40
 The Ruben court stated, however, that Jones v. Continental
Corp. clarified that the standard for section 1927 determinations in
the Sixth Circuit was an objective one, not requiring a finding of
subjective bad faith.'" In clarifying this objective standard, the court
stated that simple inadvertence or negligence that frustrates a trial
judge will not support a sanction under section 1927 unless the
attorney's conduct falls short of the obligations owed by a member
of the bar to the court and as a result, causes additional expense to
the opposing party.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
employed an objective negligent conduct standard as well. In the
1986 case of McGoldrick Oil Co. v. Campbell, Athey Zukowski, the
court of appeals assessed sanctions against the appellant's attorney
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because the court determined that the
appeal was frivolous. 42 After reviewing the record, the court of
appeals noted that there was never any justiciable dispute between
the parties.'" McGoldrick's attorney requested documents from
Campbell, Athey & Zukowski (CAZ), and CAZ offered the attorney
an opportunity to copy them. McGoldrick's attorney initially ac-
cepted the offer, and then subsequently rejected it without expla-
nation. McGoldrick's attorney filed a complaint to compel produc-
tion of these documents.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the com-
plaint was properly dismissed on CAZ's unopposed motion for sum-
mary judgment." The district court had imposed sanctions against
McGoldrick and his attorney because the complaint had no merit."
]9 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1105 (1988).
40 Id. at 981, 991. Dicta in Ruben indicates that proceeding to trial upon inadequate
evidence may lead to a sanction under section 1927 and failure to appear for trial may, in a
proper case, result in a section 1927 sanction as well, unless co-counsel is present. Id. at 989
n.11, 990 n.13.
4
 Id. at 984.
47
 793 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1986).
45 Id.
44 McGoldrick, 793 F.2d at 652-53.
45 Id. at 652.
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McGoldrick filed an appeal for reconsideration of the dismissal and
the sanctions. The court of appeals held that the appeal was frivo-
lous because it was devoid of merit. 46 The court of appeals assessed
an additional $2,000 sanction against McGoldrick's attorney, pur-
suant to section 1927 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, for filing a frivolous appeal. 47
In summary, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits utilize a "negligent conduct" standard in assessing whether
an attorney's conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably
and vexatiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under
this objective standard, the courts may sanction an attorney if his
or her negligent conduct multiplies the proceedings, thereby cre-
ating excess costs. Whether the attorney behaved in a negligent
manner for an improper purpose, such as to harass the opponent
or cause a delay, is irrelevant under the "negligent conduct" stan-
dard.
B. The Second and Third Circuits: Willful Bad Faith Standard
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits
utilize a "willful bad faith" standard in assessing whether an attor-
ney's conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and
vexatiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under this
standard, a court may sanction an attorney for multiplying the
proceedings only when there is evidence that the attorney willfully
engaged in behavior that multiplied the proceedings, thereby cre-
ating excess costs. Circuits using this standard require a clear show-
ing of bad faith.
In the 1985 case of Baker Industries v. Cerberus Ltd., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the district
court's award of attorney's fees under section 1927 and held that
willful bad faith is a prerequisite to the imposition of section 1927
sanctions." In Baker, the parties agreed with the suggestion of the
district court to refer their patent licensing dispute to a referee."
The parties also agreed that the referee's conclusions of law and
fact would be binding on both parties, without the' possibility of
court review. The defendant's attorney, however, filed objections in
the district court to the referee's legal conclusions. The district court
46 Id. at 653.
47 Id. at 654.
4, 764 F.2d 204,209-212 (3d Cir. 1985).
48 Id. at 206-07.
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ordered the defendant's attorney to pay the plaintiff's legal fees
and costs incurred as a result of the objections. 5°
The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the conduct of the
defendant's attorney following the referee's determination consti-
tuted "willful bad faith" because it was a flagrant breach of the
agreement to be bound by the referee's determination." Although
the Baker court recognized that section 1927 does not speak ex-
plicitly in terms of bad faith, the court concluded that a bad faith
finding is a precondition to the imposition of attorneys' fees under
section 1927. 52
 In addition, the court stated that there must be a
finding of "willful" bad faith on the part of the offending attorney. 53
The court of appeals stated that a court should not sanction an
attorney for a mistake in professional judgment because section
1927 requires unreasonable conduct. 54
In the 1986 case of Ford v. Temple Hospital, the Third Circuit
reaffirmed the position adopted in Baker that a finding of willful
bad faith is necessary before section 1927 sanctions may be imposed
on an attorney. 55 In Ford, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission had issued to the plaintiff and her attorney, on February
14, 1984, a notice of the right to sue Temple Hospital and the union
pursuant to a Title VII action alleging racial discrimination. 5" Ap-
pellant's attorney filed the Title VII action on May 31, 1984. In
August of that year, plaintiff's counsel received notice from the
defendants that the action might be barred because it had been
filed after the allowable ninety day period. The letter stated that
the defendants might seek to recover attorney fees and costs if the
action was not terminated.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in Oc-
tober, 1984. 57 At the summary judgment hearing, the district court
rejected the plaintiff's arguments for tolling the statute of limita-
tions, and the plaintiff did not file an appeal from this action.
Thereafter, the defendants filed motions for attorney fees, and the
district court granted the motion for sanctions pursuant to section
1927. 58 The court also granted motions for sanctions pursuant to
5" 570 F. Supp. 1237, 1259 (1983).
5 ' Raker, 764 F.2d at 211 .
52




55 790 F.2d 342, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1986).
56 Id. at 344.
57 Id.
56 Id. at 346, 348.
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the "bad faith exception" to the American Rule, a rule that requires
each party to bear its own legal costs. 59 The district court stated that
because bringing and maintaining the lawsuit was in bad faith, the
court could make an exception to the American Rule.
The Third Circuit affirmed the portion of the award assessing
sanctions for the subsequent maintenance of the suit after it had
been established that the defendant had asserted an "unchallenga-
ble" defense. 6° Although the court of appeals affirmed this portion
of the district court's award, stating that the bad faith exception to
the American Rule would support the award, the court did not
specifically mention section 1927 in the holding." The Ford court
discussed section 1927 at length, however, concurring with the
Third Circuit decision in Baker that there must be a finding of
willful bad faith before section 1927 sanctions may be imposed on
an offending attorney. 62 In elaborating on the definition of willful
bad faith, the Ford court stated that some indication of an intentional
advancement of a baseless contention that is made for an ulterior
purpose, such as harassment or delay, would be sufficient to satisfy
the section 1927 standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit uses
a similar standard. In the 1986 case of Oliveri v. Thompson, the
Second Circuit reviewed the district court's assessment of attorney
fees and costs against the plaintiff's attorney and concluded that a
section 1927 sanction was not warranted because there was no clear
showing of bad faith. 63 In Oliveri, three undercover police officers
forcibly arrested the plaintiff for attempted criminal sale of her-
oin." The district attorney's office subsequently offered to dismiss
the charges if the plaintiff would release the county and its em-
ployees of any liability for the arrest. Although the plaintiff refused
to sign the release, the district attorney dismissed the charges against
him.
The plaintiff's attorney instituted an action against the three
police officers, the police commissioner, the district attorney and
Suffolk County for unconstitutional arrest, use of excessive force
and other claims. 65 The jury concluded that the arrest was based
59 Id. See .supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the American Rule.
0° Ford, 790 F.2d at 348, 350.
61 See id. at 350.
62 Id. at 347,
SOS F.2d 1265,1277-81 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
64 Id. at 1268.
65 Id. at 1276-79.
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on probable cause and that none of the defendants had used ex-
cessive force at any time. 66 After the trial, the defendants made a
joint motion for sanctions against the plaintiff's attorney under both
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York awarded $5,000 in attorney fees against plaintiff's attor-
ney under both section 1927 and Rule 11, 67 based on the court's
determination that the plaintiff's attorney instituted meritless claims
and continued prosecution of those claims after it became apparent
that the claims had no factual or legal basis. 68
The Second Circuit concluded that the lower court erred by
imposing section 1927 and Rule 11 sanctions for instituting and
continuing meritless claims because there was no clear showing of
bad faith.69 The court stated that in order to support a section 1927
sanction, the record must contain highly specific evidence of bad
faith. 7° The Oliveri court concluded that there was insufficient evi-
dence of bad faith because the record revealed that the plaintiff's
attorney had a reasonable basis for believing that his client's claims
were colorable.
According to the court of appeals, section 1927 requires a clear
showing of bad faith similar to that necessary to invoke the court's
inherent power to punish bad faith conduct during litigation." The
court explained that a bad faith finding under both the inherent
power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 requires a finding of legal action taken
for reasons of harassment or delay or other improper purpose. 72
The court noted that the only meaningful difference between an
award made under section 1927 and one made pursuant to the
court's inherent power is that courts may assess section 1927 sanc-
tions only against attorneys or other persons authorized to practice
before the courts :73 Courts, however, may assess sanctions under
their inherent power against an attorney, a party, or both.
In summary, the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third
Circuits utilize a "willful bad faith" standard in assessing whether
an attorney's conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably
" Id. at 1270.
67 Id. at 1267-68.
68 Id. at 1275.
69 Id. at 1277,1281.
7° Id. at 1277.
" Id. at 1273.
72 Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1272.
73 Id. at 1273.
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and vexatiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under
this subjective standard, a court may sanction an attorney for mul-
tiplying the proceedings only when there is evidence that the attor-
ney willfully engaged in behavior that multiplied the proceedings,
thereby creating excess costs.
C. The Ninth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits: Reckless Conduct
Standard
The Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits utilize a "reckless conduct"
standard in assessing whether an attorney's conduct has multiplied
the proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously" within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under this standard, a court may sanction an
attorney for reckless behavior that multiplies the proceedings, cre-
ating excess costs. In addition to reckless behavior, behavior moti-
vated by willful bad faith is likewise sanctionable under this stan-
dard.
In the 1986 case of Reliance Insurance Co. v. Sweeney Corp., the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that an attorney may be sanctioned under section 1927 if the
attorney's conduct reflects a reckless indifference to the merits of a
claim. 74 In Reliance, the district court confirmed an arbitration award
for $241,000 that Century Construction Company owed to its sub-
contractor Sweeney Corporation. 75 Sweeney filed a summary judg-
ment motion against 'Reliance Insurance Company, claiming that
Reliance was liable for the award because Reliance had guaranteed
the contractor's payments to the subcontractor. Reliance filed a
conclusory opposition to the motion, argtiing that the arbitration
award covered items beyond the scope of the suretyship agreement.
Reliance's opposition to the motion did not set forth specific facts
to show that summary judgment would be premature, contrary to
the requirements for opposing summary judgment motions out-
lined in Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
district court granted summary judgment against Reliance and Re-
liance appealed. 76
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the summary judg-
ment order after concluding that Reliance's attorney was unable or
unwilling to advance any facts or legal arguments in Reliance's
14 792 F.2d 1137,1138 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
15 Id. at 1138.
7s
 Id. at 1138-39.
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favor. 77
 The court of appeals stated that the appellant's claims were
frivolous, and the court order requested Reliance and/or its counsel
to show cause as to why they should not be held accountable for
the expenses incurred by appellee in defending the appea1. 78 Nei-
ther the appellant nor his counsel responded to the request, and
the court subsequently held both parties jointly liable for $5,220 in
appellee's attorney fees. 7°
The court of appeals issued an amended opinion to explain
the propriety of the section 1927 sanction. 80 The court explained
that, although the language of section 1927 suggests deliberate
misbehavior, subjective bad faith is not necessary. 8 ' According to
the Reliance court, an attorney may be held accountable for conduct
that reflects a reckless indifference to the merits of a claim. 82
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit uses
a reckless conduct standard as well. In the 1987 case of Braley v.
Campbell, the court stated that section 1927 sanctions are appropri-
ate when an attorney's conduct manifests either intentional or reck-
less disregard for the attorney's duties to the court." In Braley,
plaintiff-appellant Braley brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, seeking damages and in-
junctive relief against a municipal hospital and others." The court
entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the
plaintiff appealed. In an unpublished order and judgment issued
by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, the panel held that the plaintiff's appeal was frivolous and
vexatious. 85 The appeal was frivolous and vexatious, the court ex-
plained, because the plaintiff's appellate brief did not set forth a
statement of the issues that the plaintiff wished the court to address,
77 Id. at 1139.
78 Id. at 1137.
79 Id.
84 Id. at 1137-38.
8 ' Id. at 1138. In Reliance, however, the court determined that subjective bad faith did
exist because neither Reliance nor its counsel responded to the court order to show cause as
to why they should not be sanctioned. Id. at 1137. The court concluded that, despite nu-
merous chances to present colorable claims at both the district and appellate courts, neither
Reliance nor its counsel gave the court any reason to believe that the appeal was brought for
any purpose other than to harass and delay. Id. at 1139. Thus, while the D.C. Circuit requires,
at a minimum, conduct evidencing a reckless indifference to the merits of a claim, bad faith
conduct is also sanctionable.
82 Reliance, 792 F.2d at 1138.
85 832 F.2d 1504, 1512 (10th Cir. 1987).
84 Id. at 1504.
85 Id. at 1507.
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contrary to the requirements of Rule 28(a)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. 8° In addition, the court observed that the
argument section of the plaintiff's brief likewise did not clarify the
issues for appeal.
The court sanctioned the plaintiff's attorney pursuant to sec-
tion 1927 and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure." The case was remanded to assess the amount of the sanc-
tion." In an en banc hearing, the court of appeals vacated the
sanctions against the attorney, however, because the panel order
imposed the sanctions without giving the attorney notice and op-
portunity to be heard. 8"
Although the Braley court vacated the sanction, it denied that
a finding of subjective bad faith was a prerequisite for the imposition
of section 1927 sanctions.`10 The court explained that such a subjec-
tive standard would be difficult to apply.•' According to the Tenth
Circuit, a court may impose section 1927 sanctions against an attor-
ney for conduct that manifests either intentional or reckless disregard
for the attorney's duty to the court.`"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
adopted a similar standard. In the 1982 case of Barad v. City of
Tacoma, the court held that a finding of intent, recklessness or bad
faith is a prerequisite to the imposition of section 1927 sanctions."3
In Barad, the defense attorney referred to the plaintiff's prior
arrests during his opening statement to the jury." 4 The judge de-
clared a mistrial and assessed section 1927 sanctions against the
defense attorney.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the issue of whether the
language "unreasonable and vexatious" implies a bad faith or in-
tentional misconduct requirement not explicit in the statute."' The
fact that defense counsel referred to plaintiff's prior arrests during
his opening statement to the jury, which resulted in a mistrial, was
not by itself sufficient to affirm the lower court's sanction against
8° Id. at 1508 11.2.
87 Id. at 1507.
88 Id. at 1507-08.
89 Id, at 1515.
9° Id, at 1512.
91 Id.
92 Id,
9' 664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir. 198'2).
" Id. at. 1340.
95 Id. at 1343.
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the attorney.• 8 The court, however, stated that the most appropriate
standard for assessing whether an attorney's conduct was sanction-
able under section 1927 was the standard requiring a finding of
"intent, recklessness or bad faith."97 The court of appeals in Barnd
concluded - that a court could not assess sanctions against defense
counsel under section 1927 without additional findings of fact as to
whether defense counsel acted recklessly or in bad faith. 98
In the 1986 case of Sautes u. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign
Committee, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
elaborated on the recklessness standard set out in Barnd. 99 In Soules,
the district court imposed the section 1927 sanction after determin-
ing that the appellant's opposition to the intervention of an inter-
ested third party was frivolous and vexatious.m The Ninth Circuit
reversed the imposition of the section 1927 sanction because the
record contained inadequate evidence of the plaintiff's bad faith or
recklessness.'°' The court stated that section 1927 sanctions require
that the attorney's conduct be in bad faith, and that bad faith is
present when an attorney "knowingly or recklessly" raises a frivolous
argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harass-
ing an opponent.' 92 In the Ninth Circuit, the court observed that
the "bad faith" standard includes "recklessness." 1 °8 Therefore, the
district court's order imposing sanctions under section 1927 was
reversed because the record lacked sufficient evidence of bad faith
or recklessness.
In summary, the Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits utilize a "reck-
less conduct" standard in assessing whether an attorney's conduct
has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under this standard, a
court may sanction an attorney for reckless behavior that multiplies
the proceedings, thereby creating excess costs. Although reckless-
96 Id. at 1340, 1343.
97 Id. at 1343.
98 Id.
99 849 F.2d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1988).
m Id. at 1185.
Lc" Id. at 1186. The Soules court did not define recklessness. In United Slates v. Blodgett,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the mere fact that an appeal was
frivolous did not establish the recklessness necessary to establish bad faith, 709 F.2d 608, 610
(9th Cir. 1983). The court stated, however, that filing a frivolous appeal solely for the purpose
of creating a delay constituted behavior that is sanctionable under section 1927. Id.
187 Soules, 849 F.2d at 1185-86.
10 Id. at 1185.
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ness is sufficient to warrant a section 1927 sanction, willful bad faith
is likewise sanctionable under this standard.
D. The Seventh Circuit: A Dual Standard
The United States Court .of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
utilizes two standards for assessing whether an attorney's conduct
warrants a section 1927 sanction. A "negligent conduct" standard
is applied when the court determines that the claim is not objectively
colorable. The court applies a "willful bad faith" standard to objec-
tively colorable claims.
In the 1985 case of In re TCI Ltd., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed a section 1927 sanction
imposed by the bankruptcy court against TCI's attorney.'" The
bankruptcy court imposed an $8,000 fine against the attorney to
cover costs incurred by the opposing party in defending against two
amended complaints that the court dismissed for failure to state a
claim. 1 °5 The district court affirmed, without assessing additional
costs.'" The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the $8,000 fine and
imposed an additional $1,000 fine for delay damages pursuant to
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedurei° 7
In affirming the fine imposed by the lower court, the Seventh
Circuit fashioned a dual standard for assessing whether an attor-
ney's conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and
vexatiously" within the meaning of section 1927." For objectively
nancolorable claims, the TCI court adopted the standard set out in
the amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'"
Under this standard, a court may sanction an attorney if a complaint
filed by an attorney is not warranted by existing law or by a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law. The court stated that conduct was objectively unreasonable
and vexatious when a lawyer pursued a path that a reasonably
careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to
be unsound."° According to the court, a lawyer engaged in bad
104 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
105 Id. at 443-45.
106 Id. at 445, 449.
1 " 7 Id. at 450.
11 ' 14 ' Id. at 445, 447.
lo" Id. at 447.
Ho Id. at 445.
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faith by acting recklessly or with indifference to the law, as well as
by acting in bad faith within the bounds of what he or she knows
to be the law. A lawyer's indifference to the law, the court concluded,
may pose substantial costs on the adverse party, and section 1927
permits a court to force the attorney to bear those costs.
When a claim was objectively colorable, however, the TCI court
stated that subjective bad faith or malice was a prerequisite for
imposition of the section 1927 sanction."' As an example, the court
stated that a lawyer who pursued a plausible claim for the sole
purpose of inflicting additional costs on the opposing party would
be guilty of abuse of the judicial process. Even those who prevail
on the merits may be liable for fees, the court held, if in bad faith
they caused their opponent to bear excessive costs." 2 The court
reasoned that the best way to control unjustified tactics in litigation
was to ensure that those who created the costs also bore them." 3
In summary, the Seventh Circuit utilizes a dual standard in
assessing whether an attorney's conduct has multiplied the proceed-
ings "unreasonably and vexatiously" within the meaning of section
1927. Under this dual standard, the Seventh Circuit applies a "neg-
ligent conduct" standard to objectively noncolorable claims, but
applies a "willful bad faith" standard to objectively colorable claims.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STANDARDS USED BY THE COURTS OF
APPEALS AND A PROPOSED DUAL STANDARD
The ideal standard for determining whether an attorney's con-
duct warrants the imposition of a section 1927 sanction is a standard
that effectively fosters the congressional goals of the statute while
minimizing potential adverse consequences." 4 The goals of section
1927 are twofold: to punish the offender for wasting the court's
time and resources by expanding the range of increased expenses
that a judge may assess against an offending attorney, and to deter
unnecessary delays in litigation 15 and abuse of court processes. 116
In Id.
112 Id. (quoting Lipsig v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
TCI, 769 F.2d at 446.
1 " See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of these standards in
relation to the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the potential dangers inherent in the application
of these standards to the statute.
115 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
n' Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 918
(1987).
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As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed in In re TCI Ltd.,
bringing costs home to those who create them is possibly the best
way to control unjustified tactics in litigation."'
Statutes purporting to effectuate the goals of punishment and
deterrence, however, may create unintended and undesirable con-
sequences for both the attorney and the legal profession. As the
House Conference Report recognized, a statute sanctioning attorney
conduct may chill an attorney's legitimate ethical obligation to rep-
resent a client zealously."' In addition, such sanctions might dis-
courage an attorney's creativity by discouraging good faith asser-
tions of novel or innovative legal theories." 9 The optimal standard,
therefore, will accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence
while avoiding the adverse consequences of chilling attorney zeal
and discouraging attorney creativity. 120 This section analyzes the
three different standards for assessing whether an attorney's con-
duct is sanctionable under section 1927. 12 '
A. The "Negligent Conduct" Standard
Under the "negligent conduct" standard, an attorney's conduct
may multiply the proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously" even
though the attorney is not aware that the conduct is improper and
even though the attorney has no improper purpose 122 for engaging
in such conduct.' 2' Under this standard, culpability attaches when
the attorney's behavior deviates from the standard of a reasonably
competent attorney. The "negligent conduct" standard fosters the
goal of punishing an attorney whose conduct multiplies the court
117 In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
119 HOUSE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2782.
n" See Mone v. C.I.R., 774 F.2d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 1985).
u See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
'I See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of these standards.
Many authors have proposed different standards for assessing attorney liability in relation
to various sanctions. See, e.g., Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response,
1984 Dm: L.J. 845, 854-56 (objective and subjective standards, or intentional and negligent
standards, applied to ,frivolous appeals); Case Comment, Awards Of Attorneys' Fees Against
Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 950, 962-68 (1980) (negligence,
malice and intentional abuse standards applied to 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Note, Rule I I Dynamics,
GI N.Y.C. L. REV. 300 (1986) (objective and subjective standards applied to Rule 11).
122 In this context, "improper conduct" and "improper purpose" refer to conduct and
motivation that violate the disciplinary rules of the A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSItmyry.
123 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "negligent
conduct." standard employed in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
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proceedings and wastes the court's time. In addition, this objective
standard has a high deterrent value, as it poses few of the problems
of proof associated with a subjective intent standard. Under the
"negligent conduct" standard, a court .need not address whether
the offending attorney was aware that his or her behavior was
improper or whether he or she had an improper purpose for en-
gaging in the conduct in question. The court need only determine
whether the attorney's behavior deviated from the objective stan-
dard of the reasonably competent attorney.
More critically, however,. the "negligent conduct" standard
poses a great danger of chilling an attorney's legitimate zeal in
representing a client by discouraging assertions of novel or inno-
vative legal theories. When a claim is objectively colorable, uncer-
tainty or inexperience would militate against taking a chance that
one's conduct might not pass the "reasonably competent attorney"
test, especially when advocating a novel legal theory. When a claim
is objectively noncolorable, zealous representation is not warranted.
In addition, section 1927 must be strictly construed because it
is penal in nature. The statute was originally enacted for the pur-
pose of reducing the litigiousness of the United States attorneys
who were paid by the pleadings.' 24 Negligent behavior was not the
type of conduct that the statute was enacted to deter. If Congress
had intended the statute to sanction any behavior that multiplied
the proceedings, it would not have been desirable to limit sanction-
able behavior to "unreasonable and vexatious" behavior.
B. The "Willful Bad Faith" Standard
Conduct is sanctionable under the "willful bad faith" standard
when an attorney multiplies the proceedings "unreasonably and
vexatiously" for an improper purpose, such as to harass an oppo-
nent or cause needless delay. 125 Application of this standard yields
a high correlation between knowingly wrongful behavior and pun-
ishment, as sanctions under this standard are only applied when an
attorney has an improper purpose for engaging in the multiplicative
and vexatious behavior. The deterrent value, however, is relatively
low due to the inherent difficulties associated with proof of subjec-
tive intent.
01 In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441,446 (7th Cir. 1985).
126 See supra notes 48-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "willful bad
faith" standard employed in the Second and Third Circuits.
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The adverse consequences of chilling attorney zeal and dis-
couraging attorney creativity, however, are less likely to play a prom-
inent role under this standard because an attorney's improper pur-
pose for pursuing a claim does not constitute zealous representation
within the bounds of the law. Nor is such behavior legitimized
because an attorney is pursuing a novel or innovative legal theory.
The willful bad faith standard, therefore, serves to impose a desir-
able chilling effect on attorney conduct motivated by improper
purposes, such as harrassment or delay.
C. The "Reckless Conduct" Standard
Under the "reckless conduct" standard, an attorney's conduct
is sanctionable when the attorney multiplies the proceedings be-
cause he or she has acted recklessly (or in bad faith). 126 Although
none of the circuits employing this "reckless conduct" standard have
defined recklessness, the Model Penal Code states that a person acts
recklessly when that person consciously disregards a known sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk.' 27 According to the Model Penal
Code, a person who commits an offense willfully is more culpable
than a person who commits an offense recklessly, and a person who
commits an offense recklessly is more culpable than a person who
commits an offense negligently.' 28 Although a lawyer who con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk is not neces-
sarily doing so for an improper purpose, consciously disregarding
a known risk evidences more culpability than mere negligence.
The "reckless conduct" standard, therefore, provides for pun-
ishment of behavior that is less culpable than the behavior required
under the "willful bad faith" standard. Deterrent value, on the other
hand, is higher with the "reckless conduct" standard than under
the "willful bad faith" standard, as a court need not prove the
existence of a subjective bad faith intent under the "reckless con-
duct" standard.
The danger of chilling attorney zeal and discouraging attorney
creativity is more acute under the "reckless conduct" standard than
126 See supra notes 74-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "reckless
conduct" standard employed in the Ninth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits.
' 27 MODEL PENAL. CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Official Draft 1962).
128 Id. at §§2.02(2)(a)—(d). In this section, entitled "General Requirements of Culpability,"
the Model Penal Code defines four degrees of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly
and negligently. A person who commits an offense purposely or knowingly is more culpable
than a person who commits an offense recklessly. Likewise, a person who commits an offense
recklessly is more culpable than a person who commits an offense negligently.
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under the "willful bad faith" standard because the "reckless con-
duct" standard does not require the existence of an improper pur-
pose. The court need only determine that the attorney consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk. A court applying
the reckless conduct standard, therefore, could impose the sanction
without an inquiry into the attorney's subjective intent.
In addition, under the "reckless conduct" standard, the dangers
of chilling attorney zeal and discouraging attorney creativity are less
acute for objectively noncolorable claims than for objectively col-
orable claims. Chilling attorney zeal and discouraging attorney cre-
ativity is desirable when the claim is objectively noncolorable, be-
cause noncolorable claims by definition do not merit an attorney's
zeal or creativity. Furthermore, applying the "reckless conduct"
standard to noncolorable claims is in keeping with the strict con-
struction required by this penal statute. Under this standard, an
attorney would not be sanctioned for pursuing a noncolorable claim
unless he or she consciously disregarded the risk that his or her
behavior would multiply the proceedings, causing needless delay or
excess costs. This element of awareness could be inferred from the
attorney's level of prior experience, thereby minimizing the chilling
effect on the inexperienced attorney.
D. Proposed Dual Standard
The most appropriate standard for assessing whether an attor-
ney's conduct has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably and
vexatiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is a dual
standard. For objectively noncolorable claims, the "reckless conduct"
standard is the most appropriate standard because unlike the "neg-
ligent conduct" standard, the "reckless conduct" standard does not
seek to punish the inexperienced attorney for mere negligence.
Rather it seeks to punish the attorney who consciously disregards
the risk that his or her conduct will needlessly multiply the pro-
ceedings, resulting in increased costs.
In addition, the "reckless conduct" standard is preferable to
the "negligent conduct" standard for objectively noncolorable claims
because section 1927 is penal in nature and must therefore be
strictly construed. Strictly construed, negligent conduct that multi-
plies the proceedings does not constitute "unreasonable and vexa-
tious" behavior when the negligent conduct is coupled with no
awareness of the impropriety of the conduct and no improper
purpose for engaging in the conduct. The "reckless conduct" stan-
March 1990]	 SANCTIONING LAWYERS	 499
dard, by contrast, necessitates an awareness of the impropriety of
the conduct and therefore more nearly equates culpable conduct
with "unreasonable and vexatious" behavior.
The "reckless conduct" standard for objectively noncolorable
claims is also more appropriate than the more stringent "willful bad
faith" standard that requires proof of an improper purpose. In
relation to noncolorable claims, it is a more appropriate standard
than the "willful bad faith" standard because noncolorable claims
are not recognized as meriting the court's attention, and therefore
the court need not require a showing of bad faith in order to avoid
chilling attorney zeal or creativity. In addition, noncolorable claims
cause delay and needlessly increase the cost of litigation regardless
of whether they are pursued for an improper purpose. As section
1927 seeks to deter conduct that results in needless delay and in-
creased costs, an attorney who recklessly pursues a noncolorable
claim is in a position to avoid these results. In addition, this standard
avoids the problems of proof associated with the "willful bad faith"
standard because, under the "reckless conduct" standard, the court
is not required to ascertain whether the attorney had an improper
purpose for engaging in the conduct in question.
For objectively colorable claims, the most appropriate standard
for assessing whether an attorney's conduct multiplies the proceed-
ings "unreasonably and vexatiously" is the "willful bad faith" stan-
dard. Before a court may impose a section 1927 sanction under this
standard, the court must find that the attorney had an improper
purpose for engaging in the conduct. In light of the importance
placed on zealous representation within the adversary system, this
stringent standard works most effectively within the context of ob-
jectively colorable claims by guarding against the dangers of chilling
attorney zeal or discouraging attorney creativity. The "improper
purpose" requirement for an objectively colorable claim preserves
the attorney's duty to represent a client zealously within the bounds
of the law while shielding the attorney from the fear of sanctions
for asserting a novel legal theory.
The "negligent conduct" standard and the "reckless conduct"
standard are less well suited for application to objectively colorable
claims because neither standard necessitates a finding of an im-
proper purpose. Without this requirement of willful bad faith, an
attorney might be hesitant to assert a novel legal theory or present
a case in a zealous manner, for fear of being sanctioned if increased
costs or delays result from his or her actions. Although the statute
seeks to deter conduct that causes needless delay and increased
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costs, it is not desirable to interpret the statute in a manner that
impinges on an attorney's ethical duty to represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law. For an objectively colorable claim,
requiring a finding of willful bad faith before a section 1927 sanc-
tion may be imposed insures that an attorney's ethical duty to rep-
resent a client zealously will not be jeopardized.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, there is no uniform standard by which to assess
whether an attorney has multiplied the proceedings "unreasonably
and vexatiously" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A sanction
for culpable conduct cannot be an effective deterrent unless the
judicial system imposes the sanction under conditions that are com-
monly understood and consistently applied. The ideal standard for
the imposition of sanctions under section 1927 is a standard that
fosters the legislative goals of punishment and deterrence without
chilling an attorney's legitimate ethical objective of zealous repre-
sentation within the bounds of the law and without discouraging
the assertion of novel or innovative legal theories. The "reckless
conduct" standard for objectively noncolorable claims and the "will-
ful bad faith" standard for objectively colorable claims fulfill these
requirements.
Without a clear standard for assessing sanctionable behavior,
section 1927 of the Judicial Code produces consequences similar to
those of the Song of the Sirens in Homer's Odyssey. The Sirens sing
a song of temptation from atop a dangerous cliff. The song tempts
unknowing sailors to alter their course toward the source of the
music, only to be dashed upon the rocks. Odysseus is able to avoid
a similar fate only because Circe has warned him of the particular
behavior that the temptation will engender and warned him of the
severity of the consequences of that behavior. Although Odysseus
believes that the only way to avoid the temptation is to plug the ears
of his crew and to bind himself to the mast, it is unlikely that an
attorney seeking to avoid a section 1927 sanction would need to go
to such extremes if the courts applied the standard for assessing
sanctionable conduct under the statute in a clear and consistent
manner.
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